O Universo dos Objetos em Alexius Meinong

Abstract

Abstract: Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) balances the learning and the influence of Franz Brentano (1838-1917) on intentionality with descriptive psychology and British empiricism. The write On the theory of object (Über Gegenstandstheorie - Selbstdarstellung), from 1904, is a claim of theory of objects as a new science and an independent science. The proposal by Alexius Meinong is in favour of metaphysical universalism in defiance of classical metaphysics with consequences for ontology and linguistics. The article searches to demonstrate how the theory of objects, as experience of the knowledge of reality, is in opposition to the tradition of Parmenides and Aristotle, about being and reality at the same time that it emerges a nearness with the notion of possible worlds. For this, Alexius Meinong expands the notion of knowledge and challenges the conceptions of being and existing in order to make use of a theory of objects as a basis of metaphysical universalism in order to provide, through the object, a theory of knowledge. Through an analytical methodology with primary and secondary bibliographic references, it is concluded that possible worlds conjoined with the theory of objects is proportional to decouple from the classic tradition of the principle of non-contradiction with effects on logic.