The Implications of Dispositional Belief for Inferential Justification
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36592/opiniaofilosofica.v14.1122Keywords:
dispositional belief. Inferential justification. Propositional justification. Infinitism. Finite Mind.Abstract
The distinction between available or dispositional and occurrent belief has a variety of applications in epistemological theory and is an essential concept for defining propositional justification. This distinction is often discussed in conjunction with the nature of epistemic justifiers, often in an obscure way. To understand the function this division plays in philosophy, it is essential to untangle these ambiguities. The remarks in this text seek to dispel these misunderstandings. In the conclusion of the paper, I present the motivations for a subjunctivist definition proposed by Richard Fumerton in the 1970s, elucidating how this definition of dispositional belief allows one to trace a path to infinitism in resolving the finite mind argument without committing to a non-inferential conception of justification.
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