Why not Hobbes?
The critique of John Rawls to Hobbes’s Moral Theory
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36592/opiniaofilosofica.v8i1.735Abstract
The aim of this article is to present the main critics that Rawls addressed to Hobbes's moral theory, showing the key aspects of the distinction between the Hobbesian theory of contract and Rawls's contractualism. The main objective is to clarify the reasons why Rawls excludes the Hobbesian doctrine of the list of theories that fit the basis for his Theory of Justice. The focus is the status of the laws of nature, which according to Rawls cannot be interpreted as principles of moral obligations in strict sense.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
The submission of originals to this journal implies the transfer by the authors of the right for printed and digital publication. Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication. If the authors wish to include the same data into another publication, they must cite this journal as the site of original publication. As the journal is of open access, the articles are allowed for free use, in scientific, educational, non-commercial applications, with citation of the source.
The papers published in Revista Opinião Filosófica are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
